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Abstract In this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition
formation. The notions of a feasible government and a stable government are central in
the model considered. By a government, we mean a pair consisting of a majority coalition
and a policy supported by this coalition. The aim of this paper is to establish which stable
government should be created if more than one stable government exists or, in case there is
no stable one, which feasible government should be formed if more than one feasible gover-
nment exists. Several bargaining procedures leading to the choice of one stable (or feasible)
government are proposed. We define bargaining games in which only parties belonging to at
least one stable (or feasible) government bargain over the creation of a government. We con-
sider different bargaining costs. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining
games defined. It turns out that the prospects of a party depend on the procedure applied, and
on the bargaining costs assumed. We also apply the coalition formation model to the Polish
Parliament after the 2001 elections and apply the different bargaining games for the creation
of a government to this example.
Keywords Stable government · Bargaining game · Subgame perfect equilibrium
1 Introduction
In the literature, one can find many works concerning coalition formation theory (see, for
instance; Austen-Smith and Banks 1988, 1990; Axelrod 1970; Baron and Ferejohn 1989;
van Deemen 1991, 1997; Grofman 1982; Kahan and Rapoport 1984; Kirchsteiger and Puppe
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1997; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Peleg 1981; Schofield 1993; de Swaan 1973; de Vries 1999).
An alternative model of coalition formation has recently been presented by van der Rijt
(2000). It belongs to the class of coalition theories that take policy preferences of parties
into consideration. A generalization of the model defined by van der Rijt has been proposed
in Rusinowska et al. (2005), and this generalized model is our point of departure here. In
this paper, we present an application of bargaining theory to the coalition formation model
introduced in Rusinowska et al. (2005). The central notions of the model are the notions of
a feasible government and a stable government. We consider the situation in which more
than one stable government exists or no stable government exists, but there are at least two
feasible governments. In order to choose only one stable (or feasible) government, parties
may negotiate with each other to create a government. To this end, some bargaining games
are defined, and subgame perfect equilibria of these games are investigated. In all bargaining
games analyzed, only parties belonging to at least one stable (or feasible) government are
involved in bargaining over the creation of a government. The games considered differ from
each other with respect to the bargaining procedure. In one of these games, only one party,
for instance the strongest one, makes offers to the others. Moreover, we consider two kinds of
games differing with respect to the bargaining costs. In the first kind, we assume one constant
bargaining cost satisfying a certain condition. In the second kind of games, a sequence of
bargaining costs is introduced, where the bargaining cost may be different in each period of the
game. The prospects of a party depend on the procedure applied, and on the bargaining costs
assumed. We present a theoretical example concerning the Polish Parliament after the 2001
elections. The example illustrates the notions defined in the generalized model (Rusinowska
et al. 2005). In our example, we find more than one stable government. Moreover, we apply
the bargaining games defined to the Polish Parliament.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we briefly describe the generalized model of
coalition formation (Rusinowska et al. 2005) to which we apply bargaining theory. In Sect. 3,
the bargaining games for choosing a government are introduced. In Sect. 4, we present an
example in which we apply the coalition formation model and the bargaining games to the
Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections. Finally, we present our conclusions in Sect. 5.
2 The Model of Coalition Formation
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of political parties in parliament, and let wi denote the number
of seats received by party i ∈ N . wi is called the weight of party i . Let q be the quotum.
A coalition S is a subset of N . A coalition S is winning if the sum of the weights of the
parties in S is at least q . Moreover, let W denote the set of all winning coalitions. The model
concerns the creation of a government by a winning coalition. It is assumed that there are
some independent policy issues, say 1, . . . , M , on which a government has to decide. Let P
denote the set of all policies p = (p1, . . . , pM ) where p j is the sub-policy on issue j .
A government is defined as a pair g = (S, p), where S is a winning coalition and p is a
policy. Hence, the set G of all governments is defined as
G := {(S, p) | S ∈ W ∧ p ∈ P}. (1)
Each party has preferences concerning all (winning) coalitions and all policies. More preci-
sely, let d0, . . . , dL be degrees of desirability, where d0 means just acceptable (desirable of
degree 0) and dL is the highest degree of desirability: 0 = d0 < d1 < · · · < dL = 1. We
assume that for each party i ∈ N there is a utility function Ui that assigns to each winning
123
An Application of Bargaining Theory 447
coalition S a value Ui (S) in {−(M + 1), d0, d1, . . . , dL } and that assigns to each sub-policy
p j on issue j a value Ui (p j ) ∈ {−(M + 1), d0, d1, . . . , dL }.
The utility Ui (g) of a government g = (S, p) is defined by
Ui (S, p) = Ui (S) + Ui (p) = Ui (S) +
M∑
j=1
Ui (p j ). (2)
As noticed in Rusinowska et al. (2005), for each government (S, p), Ui (S, p) < 0 if and
only if Ui (S) = −(M + 1) or Ui (p j ) = −(M + 1) for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , M}.
In Roubens et al. (2006) we use the MacBeth software to determine the utilities Ui (S)
and Ui (p).
A coalition S is called feasible if it is acceptable (i.e., Ui (S) ≥ 0) to all its members
i ∈ S. A policy p is feasible for a given coalition S if it is acceptable to all members of that
coalition, i.e., for all i ∈ S, Ui (p j ) ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , M . A government g = (S, p) is
feasible if S is a feasible coalition and p is a feasible policy for S. By FG we denote the set
of all feasible governments:
FG = {(S, p) ∈ G | (S, p) is feasible}. (3)
The central notion of the model introduced in Rusinowska et al. (2005) is the notion of
stability. A feasible government h = (S, p) ∈ FG dominates a feasible government g ∈ FG
(denoted as h  g) if the property
(∀ i ∈ S : Ui (h) ≥ Ui (g)) ∧ (∃ i ∈ S : Ui (h) > Ui (g)) (4)
holds. A feasible government is said to be stable if it is dominated by no feasible government,
i.e.,
g is stable := ¬ ∃ h ∈ FG [ h  g ] (5)
By SG we denote the set of all (feasible) stable governments. In Rusinowska et al. (2005),
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of a stable govern-
ment are investigated. Moreover, in the same paper the authors introduce some alternative
definitions of ‘stability’, and establish the relations between the new notions of ‘stability’
and the chosen one. In the present paper, we decide for the definition of a stable government
given by (5), which we find the most natural definition of stability.
Note that the relation of dominance defined in (4) is not necessarily acyclic, because only
the members of coalition S in government h are considered. Consequently, it is possible that
no stable government exists in the sense of definition (5).
3 Creating a Government
If there is only one stable government, this unique stable government is formed. It is clear
that, in our generalized model (Rusinowska et al. 2005), more than one stable government
may exist. In such situations, the question arises which stable government should be created.
It is also possible that no stable government exists. In that case the question is which feasible
government to form if there is more than one.
In this paper, we propose some bargaining procedures leading to the choice of one stable
(respectively, feasible) government if there is more than one. Our bargaining games are
different from the one introduced by Rubinstein (Fishburn and Rubinstein 1982; Osborne
and Rubinstein 1990; Rubinstein 1982) in several respects, as our bargaining serves a different
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purpose. As in many papers on bargaining theory, we look for subgame perfect equilibria of
the bargaining games. Let CG be the set SG of all stable governments if there is more than
one, and the set FG of all feasible governments if there is no stable government, but more
than one feasible government.
CG =
{
SG if |SG| > 1
FG if |SG| = 0 and |FG| > 1 (6)
In our games, all parties belonging to at least one government from CG bargain over the
creation of one government. Parties which are not members of a government from CG do
not participate in the negotiations. Let N CG be the set of all parties involved in at least one
government from CG. Let kCG be the number of parties in N CG , i.e., kCG = |N CG |.
Let N CG be an ordered list (n1, . . . , nkCG ) of all parties involved in at least one government
from CG, where the order is given, for instance, by the number of seats or the number of
votes.
3.1 Choosing a Government
In this subsection, we define several bargaining games in which parties from N CG bargain
over the choice of one government from CG.
We call two governments g and g′ in N CG equivalent iff Ui (g) = Ui (g′) for each
i ∈ N CG . We assume there are only finitely many non equivalent governments in CG.
GAME A is defined by the following bargaining rules:
1. The set of players in this game is N CG .
2. A party i ∈ N CG , when submitting an offer, can propose only one government from
CG such that this party belongs to it.
3. Rejecting an offer causes a following period to start.
4. A party i ∈ N CG cannot propose a government which has already been proposed before.
Then, since the set CG is finite, the extensive form of our bargaining game is finite. Parties
will not negotiate longer than |CG| periods.
5. The bargaining procedure is as follows. The first party n1 in the sequence N CG proposes
in period 1 a certain g(1) = (S(1), p(1)) ∈ CG such that n1 ∈ S(1). Next, the party
belonging to S(1) having the ‘strongest’ (the earliest) position in N CG from among all
members of S(1) excluding n1 can either accept or reject the offer. Let us denote this
party by nr (for some r = 2, . . . , kCG ). If nr rejects g(1), then period 2 starts and party
nr proposes a new government g(2) = (S(2), p(2)) ∈ CG which will again be confronted
with its members. If nr accepts g(1) and if S(1) consists of only two parties (n1 and nr ), the
game is over and g(1) is chosen, but if S(1) has more than two members, period 1 continues
and these members, starting again with the ‘strongest’ one (excluding n1 and nr ), have
to react by saying either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. If a government is accepted by all its members,
the game is over and this government is chosen. Rejecting a government causes the
rejecting party to submit its own ‘proper’ offer in the next period. By ‘proper’, we mean
that this government has not been proposed before and that this rejecting party is one of
its members. According to this procedure, there is always a period 1 ≤ t ≤ |CG| such
that no new government can be proposed anymore, because all governments from CG
have already been proposed before or/and the reacting party is not a member of another
government from CG and hence cannot make a new proposal. In such situations, the
last government proposed is chosen. In this way, the negotiations will always result in
the choice of one government from CG.
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6. In general, the result of our bargaining game is a pair (g, T ), where g ∈ CG is the
government agreed upon and 1 ≤ T ≤ |CG| is the period in which the agreement has
been reached.
7. The payment of party i ∈ N CG , if the result (g, T ) is reached, is given by
Ui (g, T ) = Ui (g) − c · (T − 1) (7)
where c > 0 is the fixed bargaining cost satisfying the following condition: for all
i ∈ N CG and for all g, g′ ∈ CG
Ui (g) > Ui (g′) 	⇒ Ui (g) − c · (|CG| − 1) > Ui (g′). (8)
All parties know the value of the fixed bargaining cost c when they start playing the game.
By introducing the bargaining cost, we assume that the payments of parties which choose
a government by negotiations decrease when the parties continue to bargain: the credibility
and the goodwill of a future government in the eyes of the public decrease if an agreement
on creating a government cannot be reached easily. On the other hand, condition (8) says that
the bargaining cost is still small enough. This means that, if a party prefers one government
to another, it will prefer that this ‘better’ government is chosen, even in the last period of the
bargaining, rather than that the ‘worse’ one is chosen immediately, that is, in period 1.
GAME A′ is similar to Game A, except that we do NOT assume condition (8), and we
generalize condition (7). Instead of one constant bargaining cost c > 0, we assume a sequence
of possibly different bargaining costs (ct )|CG|t=1 , where ct means the bargaining cost in period
t . Since we do not assume condition (8), the values of the bargaining costs may be quite
large. In explanation, we can say that, for instance, the cost in period t > 1 is high if time
between rejecting an offer in period t −1 and submitting a new one in period t is (very) long.
Formally, we have for all i ∈ N CG , for all g ∈ CG and for all T ∈ {1, . . . , |CG|}




where ct is the bargaining cost in period t . We assume c1 = 0, and ct > 0 for each 1 < t ≤
|CG|.
GAME B is like game A except that in the bargaining procedure for game B ALL parties
belonging to at least one government from CG (not necessarily belonging to the proposed
government) have to either accept or reject the government proposed. Moreover, a party may
propose a government from CG to which the party does NOT belong.
GAME B′ is like Game B, but again with a sequence of bargaining costs (ct )|CG|t=1 as in Game
A′. We do not assume condition (8) and replace condition (7) by condition (9).
GAME C is similar to game A, but now the ‘strongest’ party in N CG (that is, party n1 ∈ N CG )
is the only one party submitting offers; n1 may propose governments it does not belong to.
GAME C′ has the same rules as Game C, but again with possibly different costs over time
instead of a constant cost c. So, in Game C′ we do not assume condition (8), and we replace
condition (7) by condition (9).
We like to make some remarks concerning the games defined. First of all, each game defined is
a game with perfect and complete information, since the parties know each other’s preferences
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and they neither use a secret procedure nor bargain simultaneously. Since we have perfect
information, each information set in the extensive form of the game has only one element.
A strategy of a party participating in the negotiations is a description of its behavior in each
situation in which it has to act. In each information set of a given party, it has either to propose
one government from among all governments from CG which have not been proposed before
(and for Games A and A′, to which this party belongs), or to choose between ‘yes’ and ‘no’.
Let us try to compare the games defined in this section. In all games considered, we invite
for negotiations all parties which are ‘personally’ interested in the result of such negotiations,
that is, parties that might be responsible for a future government. Since one government from
CG has to be chosen, only parties involved in at least one government from CG play our
games. In Games A and A′, parties are involved in bargaining over a given government
only if the party belongs to this government. Examples show that a party may be better off
when it is not the first proposer; see Remark 4.1. In Games B and B′, we give a chance to
all parties involved in at least one government from CG to have influence on the result of
the negotiations. As we will see in Remark 4.2, it may happen that a party involved in a
chosen government is better off if some parties which do not belong to this government also
participated in the negotiations. Finally, we analyze Games C and C′ in which the ‘strongest’
party is the only one which may submit an offer. Games C and C′ seem to be closer to reality.
In real politics, most frequently it is the greatest party which tries to form a government by
making offers to other parties. Nevertheless, it appears that sometimes it will be better for a
party if it is another party that makes the offers; for an example, see Remark 4.3. The difference
between games denoted by the same letter (for instance, between A and A′) concerns only
the bargaining costs. In Games A, B, and C we assume the constant bargaining cost c > 0
to satisfy condition (8). In Games A′, B′, and C′ we assume a sequence of bargaining costs
(ct )
|CG|
t=1 , c1 = 0, ct > 0 for 1 < t ≤ |CG|, which may be arbitrary large.
The question arises whether our bargaining games have subgame perfect equilibria, and, if
so, what they look like and to which governments they lead. The notion of subgame perfect
equilibrium is a well-known refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium, introduced by
Reinhard Selten (1975). By definition, a subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium
in each subgame of the game. In order to find subgame perfect equilibria, we can use backward
induction. Starting from the end points of the extensive form game and going backwards to
its beginning, we choose the best moves of the players in each information set.
As we have already noted, our negotiations will result in one government being chosen. As
the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium is a refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium,
we would suggest the following advice to negotiating parties:
If there is (at least one) subgame perfect equilibrium for the bargaining game defined,
use (one of) your subgame perfect equilibrium strategies.
One can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 For all the bargaining games described, there is (at least one) subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Proof Each of the games A, A′, B, B′, C, and C′ is a finite extensive game with perfect
information, and hence, according to (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, Proposition 9.B.2) and (Osborne
and Rubinstein 1994, Proposition 99.2), it has a (pure) subgame perfect equilibrium.
Below, we indicate some ‘safe’ games for the ‘strongest’ party, that is games giving the best
result for party n1 if all parties play their subgame perfect equilibrium strategies.
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Proposition 3.2 Let BG be the set of all games considered, that is, BG = {A, A′, B, B ′, C,
C ′}. Moreover, let g∗ = (S∗, p∗) be the unique best government from CG for n1, where n1 is
the first party submitting an offer in all games from BG. Let BG∗ be the set of all bargaining
games from BG in which all subgame perfect equilibria lead to the result (g∗, 1). Let us
consider the following conditions:
∀i ∈ S∗ \ {n1} ∀(S, p) ∈ CG \ {g∗} [i /∈ S] (10)
∀i ∈ S∗ ∀g ∈ CG \ {g∗} [Ui (g∗) > Ui (g)] (11)
∀i ∈ S∗ ∀g ∈ CG \ {g∗} [c2 > Ui (g) − Ui (g∗)] (12)
∀i ∈ N CG ∀g ∈ CG \ {g∗} [c2 > Ui (g) − Ui (g∗)], (13)
where c2 > 0 is the bargaining cost in period 2. It is true that:
(a) (n1 ∈ S∗ ∧ (10)) 	⇒ A ∈ BG∗
(b) (11) 	⇒ C ∈ BG∗
(c) (n1 ∈ S∗ ∧ (11)) 	⇒ (A ∈ BG∗ ∧ C ∈ BG∗)
(d) (12) 	⇒ C ′ ∈ BG∗
(e) (n1 ∈ S∗ ∧ (12)) 	⇒ (A′ ∈ BG∗ ∧ C ′ ∈ BG∗)
(f) (13) 	⇒ (B ′ ∈ BG∗ ∧ C ′ ∈ BG∗)
(g) (n1 ∈ S∗ ∧ (13)) 	⇒ (A′ ∈ BG∗ ∧ B ′ ∈ BG∗ ∧ C ′ ∈ BG∗).
Proof (a) Suppose that n1 ∈ S∗ and condition (10) is satisfied. Then, n1 is the only party
from S∗ which may belong to more than one government from CG. Hence, when playing
Game A, if n1 proposes g∗ in period 1, all remaining members of S∗ have to say ‘yes’,
because they have nothing more to propose. This means that A ∈ BG∗.
(b), (c) Let us assume that condition (11) is satisfied. Hence, when playing Game C, if n1
proposes g∗ in period 1, then all parties which have to respond, that is, all members of
S∗ \ {n1}, will say ‘yes’ due to (11), what means that C ∈ BG∗. If additionally, n1 ∈ S∗,
then, when playing Game A, n1 may propose g∗ in period 1, and due to (11) all remaining
parties from S∗ will accept it. Hence, A ∈ BG∗.
(d), (e) Now we assume condition (12) to be satisfied. This means that if n1 proposes g∗ in
period 1, all responding parties will say ‘yes’. This happens because, by virtue of (12), for
each party from S∗, the payment for the result (g∗, 1) is greater than the payment for the
result (g, 2) for any other government g ∈ CG. Hence, C′ ∈ BG∗. If additionally, n1 ∈ S∗,
then n1 may propose g∗ also in Game A′, and hence, A′ ∈ BG∗.
(f), (g) Let us suppose that condition (13) is satisfied. This means that all parties belonging
to at least one government from CG find the result (g∗, 1) better than the result (g, 2) for
any other government g from CG. Since in B′ and in C′, n1 may propose g∗ in period 1,
B′ ∈ BG∗ and C′ ∈ BG∗. If additionally, n1 ∈ S∗, then also A′ ∈ BG∗. unionsq
Conclusion 3.1 There is always a bargaining game G ∈ BG in which all subgame perfect
equilibria lead to the result which is best for party n1.
Proof Each Game C′ with c2 satisfying (12) belongs to BG∗ by virtue of implication (d) in
Proposition 3.2. unionsq
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3.2 Comparison with Related Literature
Contrary to many other models, our model considers both office seeking motivations and
policy preferences, by treating the government coalition in the same way as the policies. The
policies in our model may be multidimensional and the number of parties is arbitrary.
David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks (1988) conceive of portfolios as benefits and a
party can be induced to join a government and compromise over the policy choice by offering
it some portfolios. The model presented in this paper has only three parties and a one-
dimensional policy space. The party with the largest number of seats proposes a coalition,
a policy, and a portfolio distribution, and if the parties which accept the proposal form
a winning coalition, the government forms. If not enough parties accept the proposal in
order to form a winning coalition, then the party with the second highest number of seats
proposes a coalition, a policy and a portfolio distribution, and the members of the proposed
coalition respond to the proposal. If neither the second nor the third government forms, a
certain government is formed which decides ‘equitably’ about the policy and the portfolio
distribution. There are several differences between the model of Austen-Smith and Banks
and our model, and some advancements of the latter, like an arbitrary number of parties
and multidimensional policies. Also, in our present model the portfolio distribution may be
incorporated just as a policy sub-issue. Moreover, while Austen-Smith and Banks present
one bargaining procedure, in which a majority of the proposed coalition must accept the
proposal, we define several bargaining games, which differ from each other with respect to
the bargaining procedure and/or bargaining costs. We compare the games and search for the
one which is best for the strongest party. In our model, either all parties forming a proposed
coalition (like in Games A and C) or all parties involved in the bargaining (like in Game B)
must approve the proposal. The bargaining is not simultaneous but sequential: the parties
respond according to the given order. Moreover, either a rejecting party (like in Games A and
B) or always the strongest party (like in Game C) submits a new proposal. In the model of
Austen-Smith and Banks, in case no government is agreed on, a certain government called
‘caretaker government’ is implemented. In our model, in case no government is agreed on,
the last proposed government forms. Hence, we do not involve any ‘outside government’,
but we choose only a government from among all stable governments (or from all feasible
governments if there is no stable one).
The model presented by David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks (1990) pays much atten-
tion to the portfolio allocation and consists of two steps: a portfolio allocation in the first
stage and in the second stage the parties comprising the government interact to determine a
policy outcome, where in general such interaction will be a function of the portfolio alloca-
tion. In our model of coalition formation we may include the portfolio allocation as a policy
sub-issue, which then together with the other policy sub-issues determines a policy, which in
its turn together with a feasible coalition may form a government with a certain utility to each
party. David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks (1990) focus on a stable portfolio allocation
and consider several notions of stability. Their paper is therefore more related to Rusinowska
et al. (2005), where we investigate the notion of stable government. Similar to Austen-Smith
and Banks (1990), we consider alternative definitions of ‘stability’ and relate them to the
concept of the core.
Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo (2000) present a two-period model of government
formation and termination, in which both majoritarian (i.e., minimal winning and surplus)
governments and minority governments may form. The model accounts for the relative insta-
bility of minority governments and for the cabinet terminations due to replacement or early
elections. In each period two shocks are realized: a shock determining the policy that would
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be implemented if no government forms, and a shock determining the electoral prospects
of all parties if parliament were dissolved and an election held. After observing the shocks,
parties negotiate over policy and distributive benefits. If no government is in power, a party
selected by the head of the state and called the formateur tries to form a new government,
while if a government is in power, parties negotiate over whether to preserve the current
government or to terminate it. If a government is terminated, parties decide whether to re-
place it immediately by a new government or to call an early election before the formation
of a new government. In a similar way as in our model, subgame perfect equilibria of the
game are investigated. However, in the paper it is assumed that there are three parties and
a two-dimensional policy space. As mentioned before, the policies in our model may be
multidimensional, and the benefits may be incorporated just as a policy sub-issue. Also the
number of parties is arbitrary in our model. Moreover, we do not focus on one bargaining
procedure, but we present several games and compare them.
Massimo Morelli (1999) proposes a model of majoritarian bargaining in which players
demand a compensation for their participation in a coalition and in which the order of play is
endogenous, in that the head of state chooses the first mover, and the latter chooses the order of
response. Each party’s strategy at each bargaining round contains a demand that may specify
a policy proposal and the amount of private benefits (ministerial and nonministerial payoffs)
a party would want if selected in a majority coalition. The subgame perfect equilibrium
payoff distribution of the bargaining game introduced there is proportional to the exante
distribution of bargaining power and approximately proportional to the distribution of seats
in the winning coalition. However, the model in Morelli (1999) has a unidimensional policy
space. Massimo Morelli remarks in the conclusion that ‘When this model is extended to
multidimensional policy spaces, I expect to obtain an explanation of why parties outside a
government coalition often receive positive payoffs’. Our results further on for the given
example seem to confirm this expectation. Moreover, while in Morelli (1999) one bargaining
procedure is considered, in our paper we define and compare several bargaining procedures.
Furthermore, while Morelli assumes a discount factor which is constant for all rounds of
the bargain, in our paper, for some types of the games, we assume a sequence of bargaining
costs, that is, the bargaining costs may be different from each other in each round.
In the literature, one can find several works in which bargaining models of government
formation are estimated. Antonio Merlo (1997) structurally estimates a multilateral stocha-
stic model of sequential bargaining and he focuses on the timing and the terms of government
agreements. Policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining proce-
dure are conducted. The author shows that the model fits well postwar Italian data on the
duration and negotiations over the formation of new governments and government durations.
A sequence of 47 Italian governments over the period 1948–1994 has been analyzed.
Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo (2004) present an empirical investigation of two
coalitional bargaining procedures: a procedure proposed by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988)
and a procedure proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Diermeier and Merlo conclude that
there is little empirical support for the coalitional bargaining procedure proposed in Austen-
Smith and Banks (1988), which postulates that parties are selected to make government
proposals in order of their seat shares. Next they conclude that the coalitional bargaining
procedure proposed in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), which postulates that the probability
parties are selected to make government proposals is proportional to their seat shares, can be
justified on empirical grounds and captures important features of the data.
Daniel Diermeier et al. (2003) estimate a bargaining model of government formation that
builds on their previous work presented in Diermeier and Merlo (2000) and Merlo (1997).
They conduct constitutional experiments to investigate the impact of specific institutional
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features of parliamentary democracies on the government formation process. In the paper,
255 governments in nine West European countries over the period 1947–1999 are considered.
In our future research we would like to follow the works, in which the government for-
mation models have been estimated, and to conduct empirical research on our model. Since
our model, on the one hand differs from the pre-existing models on government formation,
and on the other hand has its advancements, experiments on this model and the bargaining
procedures may give interesting and meaningful results.
4 The Example
In order to illustrate the notions introduced, we will construct a relatively simple theoretical
example based on the Polish government. In our example, we assume the real structure of
the Polish government after the 2001 elections, but any additional assumptions (concerning,
for instance, policy issues, budget, the preferences of each party) will be purely theoretical
and simplified.
Let us suppose that the Polish government has to decide on two independent issues:
education+medical services, and foreign policy. Both issues consist of some dependent sub-
issues. We assume that there is one fixed budget (let us say, 100) for both education and
medical services. This means that if a government assigns a larger budget for education, it
has to spend less on medical services. Moreover, we assume that a decision about introducing
a certain reform of the educational system has to be made. Introducing such a reform also
implies a larger budget for education (let us say, at least 1/4 of this budget, that is, 25 has to
be spent on education if the reform is planned). In the matter of foreign policy, we assume
that the government has to decide whether Poland will attempt to enter the European Union
or not, and depending on this decision, it has to choose a kind of foreign policy. If Poland
wants to enter the European Union, the government has to choose one foreign policy from
among a, b, and c, and otherwise, it must choose from the set {d, e, f }.
So, more formally, we assume the following two issues (M = 2) and sub-issues:
Issue 1: education and medical services:
sub-issue 1(1) with policy subspace B1(1) = {yes, no} : introducing a reform of the educa-
tional system;
sub-issue 1(2) with policy subspace B1(2) = [0, 100]: expenditure for education;
sub-issue 1(3) with policy subspace B1(3) = [0, 100]: expenditure for medical services.
Issue 2: foreign policy:
sub-issue 2(1) with policy subspace B2(1) = {yes, no}: entering the European Union;
sub-issue 2(2) with policy subspace B2(2) = {a, b, c, d, e, f }: choosing a foreign policy.
Given the description above, the policy space B is by definition B1 × B2 with
B1 = {(yes, p1(2), p1(3)) : p1(2) + p1(3) = 100 ∧ p1(2) ≥ 25 ∧ p1(3) ≥ 0} ∪
{(no, p1(2), p1(3)) : p1(2) + p1(3) = 100 ∧ p1(2) ≥ 0 ∧ p1(3) ≥ 0}
B2 = {(yes, a), (yes, b), (yes, c), (no, d), (no, e), (no, f )}
After the last parliamentary elections in Poland, which were held in September 2001, the
Lower House of the Polish Parliament consisted of the following parties:
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1. SL D + U P: Coalition of SL D (Alliance of the Democratic Left) and U P (Labour
Union)—216 seats,
2. PO: Civil Platform—65 seats,
3. S AM : Self-Defence—53 seats,
4. Pi S: Law and Justice—44 seats,
5. P SL: Polish Peasant Party—42 seats,
6. L P R: Polish Family Alliance—38 seats,
7. M N : German Minority—2 seats.
For our example, we have n = 7 and
N = {SL D + U P, PO, S AM, Pi S, P SL , L P R, M N }.
The total number of seats in the Lower House of the Polish Parliament is 460. We assume
absolute majority, hence q = 231. The weight wi of each party i ∈ N is the number of seats
assigned to the party after the election.
We will determine all feasible governments for our leading example. Let us start with
feasible coalitions. Although there are many majority coalitions in our example, we assume
that only three of them are feasible:
FC = {SL D–P SL , SL D–PO, SL D–Pi S}
Table 1 shows the values assumed for these feasible coalitions. We restrict our analysis to
the parties forming the feasible coalitions.
Tables 2 and 3 present the values to a party from FC of policies on issues 1 and 2,
respectively. In Table 2, we included only policies on issue 1 that have a non-negative value
for at least one party.
From Tables 2 and 3, we can construct 6 × 6 = 36 policies. Let
U = (USL D, UP O , UPi S, UP SL).
Table 1 Values Ui (S) of
feasible coalitions S i SLD+UP (SLD) PO PiS PSL
S






SL D–Pi S 0 −3 13 −3
Table 2 Values Ui (p1) of some
policies p1 on issue 1 ‘education
and medical services’
i SLD + UP PO PiS PSL
p1 = (p1(1), p1(2), 100 − p1(2))
p1(1) = yes, p1(2) ∈ [30, 40) −3 13 13 −3
p1(1) = yes, p1(2) ∈ [40, 50) 13 1 1 −3
p1(1) = yes, p1(2) ∈ [50, 60) 13 1 1 23
p1(1) = yes, p1(2) = 60 23 1 1 23
p1(1) = no, p1(2) ∈ [40, 50) 0 −3 −3 −3
p1(1) = no, p1(2) = 50 1 23 −3 0
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Table 3 Values Ui (p2) of
policies p2 on issue 2 ‘foreign
policy’
i SLD + UP PO PiS PSL
p2
(yes, a) −3 1 1 0





(yes, c) 1 13 1 −3
(no, d) −3 −3 −3 −3
(no, e) −3 −3 −3 13
(no, f ) −3 −3 −3 −3
Let us write down the values of several policies, for instance:
p′ = ((no, 50, 50), (yes, b)) and p′′ = ((yes, [40, 50), p1(3)), (yes, b))

























Finally, again using (2), we can calculate the values of the governments. For instance, the



















Note that, for example, for PO, g′ and g′′ have the same values, which means that PO is
indifferent regarding the choice between (SL D–PO, p′) and (SL D–P SL , p′′): SL D–PO
has the value 13 for PO and p
′ has the value 53 for PO, while SL D–P SL has the value 0 for
PO and p′′ has the value 2 for PO.
Next, we will write down all feasible governments. To start with, Table 4 presents all feasible
policies and their values.
Table 4 All feasible policies p for feasible coalitions S U = (USL D , UP O , UPi S , UP SL )
Feasible policy p for S Feasible coalition S U (p)



























3 , 2,− 73
)
p(5) = ((yes, 60, 40), (yes, b)) SLD–PO, SLD–PiS
(
1, 2, 43 , 1
)
SLD–PSL





3 , 2,− 73
)





3 ,− 83 , 13
)
p(8) = ((no, 50, 50), (yes, c)) SLD–PO (2, 1,−2,−3)
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Table 5 All feasible governments U = (USL D, UP O , UPi S , UP SL )
(S, p) U (S) U (p) U (S, p)
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(SL D–P SL , p(5)) (1, 0, 0, 1)
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As we can see from Table 4, there is an infinite number of feasible policies available
for the composition of feasible governments (we denoted them as p(1) − p(8)), there are
three feasible coalitions, and finally, there is an infinite number of feasible governments.
Nevertheless, each two policies belonging to the same p(k), k = 1, . . . , 8, are equivalent.
Hence, we consider only a finite number of policies, and a finite number of governments.
Note that the policies shown in Table 4 are feasible for several (majority) coalitions.
Table 5 shows all feasible governments for our example. Let us check now which of
the feasible governments presented in Table 5, if any, are stable. It appears that only three
feasible governments, that is, (SL D–P SL , p(5)), (SL D–P SL , p(7)), and (SL D–P O, p(8))
are dominated by no feasible government. Hence, we get three stable governments:
SG = {g(1), g(2), g(3)}, where
g(1) = (SL D–P SL , p(5)) with p(5) = ((yes, 60, 40), (yes, b)),
g(2) = (SL D–P SL , p(7)) with p(7) = ((no, 50, 50), (yes, b)),
g(3) = (SL D–P O, p(8)), with p(8) = ((no, 50, 50), (yes, c))
Table 6 presents the stable governments and their values. Since Pi S is not involved in further
negotiations, we restrict our analysis to parties SL D, PO and P SL , and now we assume that
U = (USL D, UP O , UP SL).
Our example is purely theoretical, as an analysis of Table 6 shows. We get, for instance, that
governments g(1) and g(2), in which SL D creates a coalition with P SL , are more preferred
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Table 6 Stable governments
U = (USL D , UP O , UP SL ) g = (S, p) U (S) U (p) U (g)
g(1) = (SL D–P SL , p(5)) (1, 0, 1) (1, 2, 1) (2, 2, 2)
g(2) = (SL D–P SL , p(7)) (1, 0, 1) ( 43 , 53 , 13 ) ( 73 , 53 , 43 )
g(3) = (SL D–P O, p(8)) ( 23 , 13 , 13 ) (2, 1,−3) ( 83 , 43 ,− 83 )
by PO than government g(3), in which SL D forms a coalition with PO. Although PO prefers
coalition SL D–P O to coalition SL D–P SL , it finds policy p(8) much less attractive than
policies p(5) and p(7), and hence, finally, PO prefers governments with SL D–P SL (as a
governing coalition) to a government with SL D–P O . One may say that in this example, PO
prefers moving to the opposition instead of belonging to the government. Such a situation,
although it can be explained, does not seem to be so realistic. However, our main aim when
constructing this example was not to present the actual preferences of the Polish parties and
the real political situation in Poland, but rather to use the composition of the Polish Parliament
in order to show how our definitions (in particular, the negotiations) can be applied and how
they work.
Let us apply now the bargaining procedures introduced in the preceding section to our
example with three stable governments: CG = SG = {g(1), g(2), g(3)}, N CG = {SL D, P O,
P SL}, |CG| = 3, nCG = 3.
In the further considerations, no matter which order is assumed, ( f1, f2, f3) will denote
a subgame perfect equilibrium, where f1 denotes the strategy of SL D, f2 the strategy of PO
and f3 the strategy of P SL .
4.1 Games A and A′
Since in our example all coalitions belonging to stable governments are only two-party
coalitions, the ordered lists of parties having the same starting party give precisely the
same extensive form games A and A′. Hence, N SG = (SL D, PO, P SL) and N SG =
(SL D, P SL , P O) create the same games. Similarly, the ordered lists N SG = (P O, SL D,
P SL) and N SG = (P O, P SL , SL D) give the same extensive form games, and finally,
N SG = (P SL , SL D, P O) and N SG = (P SL , PO, SL D) form the same bargaining games.
Let us consider Games A and A′, where N SG = (SL D, PO, P SL) or N SG = (SL D,
P SL , P O). This means that SL D starts the bargaining, proposing one of the three govern-
ments in period 1. If it proposes g(3), then the game is over with the result (g(3), 1), because
PO has no other offer to submit (PO is only a member of g(3)). If SL D proposes g(1) or
g(2), then P SL is involved in the negotiations. Suppose that SL D offers g(1). If P SL says
‘yes’, then the game is over and the result is (g(1), 1). However, if P SL rejects g(1), it has
to submit its offer in period 2. Since P SL is a member of two governments (g(1) and g(2))
and g(1) has already been proposed in period 1, P SL will propose g(2), which will be either
accepted or rejected by SL D. Again, accepting g(2) implies the result (g(2), 2), and rejecting
causes SL D to offer g(3) in period 3 which has to be accepted by PO. The parties reach then
the result (g(3), 3). Suppose now that SL D proposes g(2) in period 1. If P SL says ‘yes’, the
result is (g(2), 1), otherwise P SL offers g(1) in period 2. Accepting this offer by SL D gives
the result (g(1), 2), and rejecting it causes that SL D proposes g(3) in period 3 which has to
be accepted by PO. Then we have the result (g(3), 3).
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By analogy, we construct the games with PO or P SL starting the negotiations. One can
prove the following fact.
Fact 4.1 For Game A, given Table 6, there are the following subgame perfect equilibria:
1. If SL D is the first proposer, then there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium ( f1, f2, f3)
which looks as follows:
• f1—strategy of SL D :
In period 1, it proposes g(3).
In period 2, it accepts neither g(1) nor g(2).
In period 3, it proposes g(3).
• f2—strategy of PO : When g(3) is proposed, it always says ‘yes‘.
• f3—strategy of P SL :
In period 1, it accepts both g(1) and g(2).
In period 2, if g(1) has been proposed in period 1, it submits g(2);
if g(2) has been proposed in period 1, it proposes g(1).
This subgame perfect equilibrium leads to the result (g(3), 1), that is, SL D proposes (in
period 1) to create the government g(3), and PO agrees.
2. If PO is the first proposer, then there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium ( f1, f2, f3) :
• f1—strategy of SL D :
In period 1, it accepts g(3).
In period 2, it proposes g(1).
In period 3, it always accepts an offer.
• f2—strategy of PO: In period 1, it proposes g(3).
• f3—strategy of P SL :
In period 2, it accepts g(1), but it rejects g(2).
In period 3, if g(1) has been proposed in period 2, it submits g(2);
if g(2) has been proposed in period 2, it proposes g(1).
This subgame perfect equilibrium leads to the result (g(3), 1), that is, PO proposes (in
period 1) to create the government g(3), and SL D agrees.
3. If P SL is the first proposer, then there are two subgame perfect equilibria ( f1, f2, f3)
and ( f1, f2, f ′3), where:• f1—strategy of SL D:
In period 1, it does not accept either g(1) or g(2).
In period 2, it always proposes g(3).
• f2—strategy of PO: In period 2, it always accepts g(3).
• f3—strategy of P SL :
In period 1, it proposes g(1).
In period 2, it accepts both g(1) and g(2).
• f ′3—strategy of P SL :
In period 1, it proposes g(2).
In period 2, it accepts both g(1) and g(2).
Both subgame perfect equilibria lead to the result (g(3), 2).
Proof For each case analyzed, we construct the extensive form of the game and then, using
formulas (7) and (8), and Table 6, we use backward induction. Starting from the end points
of the game and going backwards to its beginning, we choose the best response of a given
player in each information set. unionsq
Let us consider examples of Game A′ with some bargaining costs. We will see that introducing
higher costs frequently changes the number and the form of subgame perfect equilibria as
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well as the result of the game. Using again backward induction, one can easily prove the
following fact.
Fact 4.2 For Game A′, given Table 6, there are the following subgame perfect equilibria:
1. If SL D is the first proposer, c2 = 23 , and c3 > 23 , then there are two subgame perfect
equilibria ( f1, f2, f3) and ( f1, f2, f ′3) which look as follows:• f1—strategy of SL D:
In period 1, it proposes g(3).
In period 2, it accepts both g(1) and g(2).
In period 3, it proposes g(3).
• f2—strategy of PO : When g(3) is proposed, it always says ‘yes’.
• f3—strategy of P SL :
In period 1, it accepts both g(1) and g(2).
In period 2, if g(1) has been proposed in period 1, it submits g(2);
if g(2) has been proposed in period 1, it proposes g(1).
• f ′3—strategy of P SL :
In period 1, it accepts g(1), but it rejects g(2).
In period 2, if g(1) has been proposed in period 1, it submits g(2);
if g(2) has been proposed in period 1, it proposes g(1).
Both subgame perfect equilibria lead to the result (g(3), 1).
2. If PO is the first proposer, c2 > 0 is arbitrary, and c3 > 23 , then there is only one
subgame perfect equilibrium ( f1, f2, f3) :
• f1—strategy of SL D :
In period 1, it accepts g(3).
In period 2, it proposes g(2).
In period 3, it always accepts an offer.
• f2—strategy of PO : In period 1, it proposes g(3).
• f3—strategy of P SL :
In period 2, it accepts both g(1) and g(2).
In period 3, if g(1) has been proposed in period 2, it submits g(2);
if g(2) has been proposed in period 2, it proposes g(1).
This subgame perfect equilibrium leads to the result (g(3), 1).
3. If P SL is the first proposer, and c2 > 23 , then there is only one subgame perfect equili-
brium ( f1, f2, f3):
• f1—strategy of SL D :
In period 1, it accepts both g(1) and g(2).
In period 2, it always proposes g(3).
• f2—strategy of PO: In period 2, it always accepts g(3).
• f3—strategy of P SL :
In period 1, it proposes g(1).
In period 2, it accepts both g(1) and g(2).
This subgame perfect equilibrium leads to the result (g(1), 1).
Proof Similarly as in the proof of Fact 4.1. For each case considered, the extensive form of
the game is constructed. Next, using formula (9), and Table 6, we use backward induction. unionsq
Let us compare the games analyzed. Note that the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of
SL D and P SL are different in the games A and A′, with SL D as first proposer. Introducing
even very high bargaining costs cannot change the result of the game. In both cases, the
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result will be always (g(3), 1). But it does change the form and the number of subgame
perfect equilibria. Game A has only one subgame perfect equilibrium, but Game A′ has two
subgame perfect equilibria. In case P SL is the first proposer, introducing higher bargaining
costs may additionally change the result. Game A with P SL proposing first, has two subgame
perfect equilibria, both leading to the result (g(3), 2). If we assume that c2 > 23 , then Game
A′ has only one subgame perfect equilibrium, leading to the result (g(1), 1).
Note that in Game A with P SL as the first proposer, both subgame perfect equilibria
give the stable government g(3) which has the lowest (even negative) value for P SL . So,
sometimes a subgame perfect equilibrium may lead to the worst result for the first proposer,
as is shown in this case. If c2 > 23 , then the situation of P SL changes completely, because
then the best government for P SL is reached, and already in period 1.
Remark 4.1 Note that in game A′ with PO as first proposer, c2 > 0 and c3 > 23 , the subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome is (g(3), 1), the worst possible outcome for PO. But with P SL
as first proposer and c2 > 23 , the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is (g
(1), 1), the best
possible outcome for PO. So, a party may be better off when it is not the first proposer.
4.2 Games B, B′, C and C′
Fact 4.3 For Game B described, given Table 6, if N SG = (SL D, PO, P SL), then there are
256 subgame perfect equilibria, but each of them leads to the result (g(1), 1), that is, SL D
proposes g(1) in period 1, and both PO and P SL agree.
Since Game B can have so many subgame perfect equilibria, in principle, we would not
recommend it to play. There are two reasons for such a huge number of equilibria in our
Game B: responses of PO in period 1, and responses of SL D in period 2. In period 1, if SL D
proposes g(2), then both responses ‘yes’ and ‘no’ give the same result for PO. Similarly, if
SL D offers g(3), then both accepting and rejecting lead to the same result for PO. Hence,
we have already 22 possibilities for a strategy of PO. If either g(1) or g(2) has been proposed
in period 1, then in each subgame starting in period 2 with either PO or P SL proposing
an offer, if g(3) is proposed in period 2, then both saying ‘yes’ and ‘no’ by SL D give the
same result for SL D. There are four such subgames. Similarly, if g(3) has been proposed
in period 1, then in each subgame starting in period 2 with either PO or P SL proposing, if
g(2) is offered in period 2, then both the acceptance and the rejection of g(2) give the same
result for SL D. There is one such a subgame perfect equilibrium with P SL proposing, and
one such a subgame perfect equilibrium with PO offering. Hence, since there are together
six such subgames, we have 26 possibilities for a strategy of SL D. Hence, together we get
22 × 26 = 256 subgame perfect equilibria.
Introducing very high bargaining costs may completely change the situation. Using back-
ward induction, one can show that
Fact 4.4 For Game B′ described, given Table 6, if N SG = (SL D, PO, P SL) and c2 = c3=5,
then there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium, and it leads to the result (g(3), 1), that
is, SL D proposes g(3) in period 1, and both PO and P SL agree.
Remark 4.2 In game A, party PO is involved in the chosen government g(3). But PO is better
off in game B, in which also P SL , not belonging to g(3), participates in the negotiations,
since in game B with order (SL D, P O, P SL) the subgame perfect equilibria lead to the
result (g(1), 1), which is the best possible result for PO. So, a party involved in a chosen
government may be better off if parties not belonging to this government also participate in
the negotiations.
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Fact 4.5 For Game C described, given Table 6, if N SG = (SL D, PO, P SL) or N SG =
(SL D, P SL , P O), then there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium ( f1, f2, f3), which
leads to the result (g(1), 1).
Fact 4.6 For Game C′ with c2 > 23 , and 0 < c3 <
1
3 , given Table 6, if N SG = (SL D, PO,
P SL) or N SG = (SL D, P SL , P O), then there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium
( f1, f2, f3), which leads to the result (g(3), 1).
Remark 4.3 In game C with SL D as the (only) party that can make proposals, the subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome is (g(1), 1), which is the best possible outcome for P SL that is
a member of this government, while g(1) is the worst possible outcome for SL D. So, it may
be better for a party if another party makes the offers.
4.3 What is Best for the Strongest Party?
Let us analyze the games considered with respect to the ‘strongest’ party, that is n1 in the
ordered list N CG . Table 7 presents the comparison of all six games analyzed. For Games A′,
B′, and C′, we also add examples of the bargaining costs c2 and c3 for which these games
lead to the results mentioned.
Note that Table 7 mentions only the results of the games, and it does not present the precise
forms of the subgame perfect equilibria. This is why the costs mentioned in Table 7 are more
general than those mentioned in Facts 4.2, 4.4, and 4.6.
One can conclude from the analysis of Table 7, that Game A is one of the best ways for
SL D to reach its best result (g(3), 1), that is, its most valuable government g(3) already in
period 1. One may construct an example, in which Game C′ is the only game leading to the
best result for party n1. Nevertheless, in our example, it is Game A which leads to (g(3), 1).
Moreover, in our example, all Games A′, B′, and C′, lead to the result (g(3), 1). Moreover, in
Game A′, for instance, both costs c2 and c3 may be arbitrary, and Game A′ will always give
the result (g(3), 1), no matter how high c2 is. Game B gives the result (g(1), 1) which is the
best result for both PO and P SL . In fact, for PO and P SL , government g(3) has the smallest
value from among the values of all stable governments. For Game C′, the bargaining costs
are smaller than the ones for Game B′.
Table 7 Comparison of bargaining games with NCG = (SL D, PO, P SL) and U = (USL D , UP O , UP SL )
Game Costs Result Parties involved U (g)
Game A condition (8) (g(3), 1) SL D, PO ( 83 , 43 , − 83 )
Game A′ c2 > 0—arbitrary (g(3), 1) SL D, PO ( 83 , 43 , − 83 )
c3 > 0—arbitrary
Game B condition (8) (g(1), 1) SL D, P SL (2, 2, 2)
Game B′ c2 > 143 (g(3), 1) SL D, PO ( 83 , 43 , − 83 )
c3 > 0—arbitrary
Game C condition (8) (g(1), 1) SL D, P SL (2, 2, 2)
Game C′ c2 > 23 (g(3), 1) SL D, PO ( 83 , 43 , − 83 )
c3 > 0—arbitrary
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we applied bargaining theory to a new model of coalition formation. The central
notions of this model are the notions of a feasible government and a stable government.
In order to choose one stable government in case there is more than one (or one feasible
government if there is no stable one and several feasible ones), we introduced negotiations
between parties, resulting in the choice of one stable (feasible) government. We defined
several bargaining games and investigated the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. In
Proposition 3.2 we gave conditions under which the strongest party (n1 ∈ N CG ) can achieve
its best possible result by playing an appropriate bargaining game. As a consequence we
found that there is always a bargaining game in which all subgame perfect equilibria lead
to the best possible outcome for the strongest party n1. We applied the coalition formation
model and the bargaining games to the Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections with respect
to some fictitious policy issues. For this example, we compared all bargaining games.
Our example shows that in the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, depending on the
bargaining game,
– a party may be better off when it is not the first proposer (Remark 4.1);
– a party involved in a chosen government may be better off if parties not belonging to this
government also participate in the negotiations (Remark 4.2);
– it may be better for a party if another party makes the offers (Remark 4.3).
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